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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Kasey A. Smith appeals from his conviction and sentence for felony injury
to a child. On appeal he challenges the district court’s orders denying his motion
to suppress his statements in a police interview and determining he was in
breach of the plea agreement.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Smith’s step-daughter M.O. disclosed that Smith had fondled her genitals.
(R., pp. 25-27.) Smith agreed to submit to a Computer Voice Stress Analysis test
(“CVSA”) and interview and, during the latter, admitted touching M.O.
inappropriately. (R., pp. 27-30.) The state charged Smith with one count of
lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 16. (R., pp. 72-73.)
Smith filed a motion to suppress the statements he made in the interview.
(R., pp. 174-75.) He asserted that the case of State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910,
285 P.3d 1014 (Ct. App. 2012), “is controlling” because Lieutenant Kelley made
“misrepresentations,” denied Smith’s requests to call his wife, and “talked about
the potential impact with the judge.” (R., pp. 350-51.) The district court found the
facts relevant to this motion as follows:
On June 21, 2013, Fort Hall Police received a report from Fort Hall
Tribal Health & Human Services that during Counseling Family
Services a juvenile reported an incident of sexual assault. The
alleged perpetrator was Kasey Smith and the alleged victim was his
stepdaughter, [M.O.]. On October 8, 2013, the Pocatello Police
Department received a copy of the report and on December 18,
2013, Smith was interviewed by Officer Cliff Kelley of the Pocatello
Police Department in connection with the accusations.
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Prior to beginning the interview, Kelley informed Smith of his rights
and what was going to happen that day. He also asked Smith to
sign a waiver which indicated that he understood that he did not
have to go forward with the interview, that he could remain silent
the whole time, and that he was consenting to a truth verification
examination. This waiver also included the standard Miranda
warnings. Smith voluntarily elected to sign the waiver
acknowledging that he understood and wished to move forward.
After signing the verification, Kelley performed a computer voice
stress analysis (CVSA) test on Smith in which Kelley asked
questions and Smith gave answers. This test is a common
investigation tool that the department uses when interrogating
individuals. The purpose of the test is to detect stress patterns in a
person’s responses to questions and then formulate appropriate
follow-up questions. Following the CVSA test, during questioning,
Smith admitted to touching his stepdaughter [M.O.] inappropriately.
(R., pp. 353-54.)

The district court concluded: “After reviewing all available

information, the Court finds no evidence to support the claim of coercion. Smith’s
confession was done knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” (R., p. 357.)
The parties thereafter entered into a plea agreement under the following
terms:
1. State will amend the charge to Felony Injury to Child
2. The State will recommend an underlying sentence of 3 and 7.
3. The Defendant will complete a Psycho-sexual evaluation with a
full disclosure polygraph (PSE).
4. If the PSE returns with no other hands on victims and low to
moderate risk to re-offend, the Stat will concur in the PSI with no
more than a rider. If not, the State can argue for imposition of
sentence.
5. Defendant can argue for any sentence.
(R., p. 373 (verbatim); see also 6/13/16 Tr., p. 1, L. 8 – p. 2, L. 1.) As part of the
plea agreement Smith also preserved on appeal the right to challenge the denial
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of his motion to suppress. (R., p. 373; 6/13/16 Tr., p. 2, Ls. 5-12.) Pursuant to
this plea agreement, Smith pled guilty to the amended charge of injury to a child.
(R., pp. 365-66, 375; 6/13/16 Tr., p. 2, L. 17 – p. 3, L. 19.)
Smith later participated in a psychosexual evaluation and polygraph, but
when the polygraph indicated deception regarding past sexual contact with
children, Smith “terminated the process.”

(R., p. 387; Confidential Exhibits,

pp. 71-72.) On the state’s motion, the district court held that Smith was in breach
of the plea agreement and the state was released from the sentencing
recommendations obligation in the plea agreement. (R., pp. 386-89.) The state
ultimately recommended the district court impose and execute a sentence of ten
years with four years fixed. (8/22/16 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 14-24.) The district court
imposed a sentence of ten years with three years fixed. (R., pp. 391-93.)
Smith filed an appeal timely from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 396-98.)

3

ISSUES
Smith states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Smith’s motion to
suppress?

II.

Did the district court err on concluding Mr. Smith breached
the plea agreement, thereby relieving the State of its
obligation to recommend a unified sentence of ten years,
with three years fixed?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Smith failed to show factual or legal error in the district court’s order
denying Smith’s motion to suppress?

2.

Has Smith failed to show error in the district court’s determination that
Smith breached the plea agreement by refusing to cooperate with the
polygraph examination after it showed deception on questions about prior
victims?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Smith Has Failed To Show Factual Or Legal Error In The District Court’s Order
Denying Smith’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded there was “no evidence to support the claim of

coercion” and “Smith’s confession was done knowingly, intelligently and
voluntarily.” (R., pp. 356-57.) Rather than argue the district court erred, Smith
argues the “State cannot meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mr. Smith’s confession was voluntary.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)
The only mention of the district court’s findings or analysis is a single sentence:
“The district court discounted the test’s lack of reliability, noting the State did not
intend to introduce the test result itself as evidence. (R., p.357.)” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 10.) Because Smith has not challenged the district court’s ruling on
appeal, but has instead asserted contrary to precedent that the state bears some
sort of burden on appeal, his claim of error fails.
B.

Standard Of Review
“In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence,

this Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error; however, the
Court freely reviews the application of constitutional requirements in light of the
facts found.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 558, 199 P.3d 123, 133 (2008).
See also State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App.
1996). As part of the clear error standard, the power to assess the credibility of
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences
5

is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez–Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d
993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662
(Ct. App. 1999).
C.

The Law And The Record Support The District Court’s Denial Of The
Motion To Suppress
The state’s use of a statement that the defendant made involuntarily is a

violation of due process. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1985); Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514–15 (1963). In determining whether a
statement was involuntary, the inquiry is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant’s will was overborne by police coercion. Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286 (1991); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163–
67 (1986). Because the question is whether the defendant’s will was overborne
by police coercion, “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding
that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
The totality of the circumstances includes such factors as the
characteristics of the accused, whether Miranda1 warnings were given, the youth
of the accused, the accused’s level of education or low intelligence, the length of
the detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and
deprivation of food or sleep. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226
(1973). The presence of Miranda warnings is a particularly significant factor, and
often determinative of a claim of coercion. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600,

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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608–09 (2004) (“[M]aintaining that a statement is involuntary even though given
after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual stamina, and
litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver.”);
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n. 20 (1984) (“[C]ases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement
was ‘compelled’ despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to
the dictates of Miranda are rare.”) State v. Brown, 160 Idaho 635, 637, 377 P.3d
1098, 1100 (Ct. App. 2016).
The district court concluded that there was “no evidence to support the
claim of coercion” and that Smith’s statements were voluntary. (R., pp. 356-57.)
Specifically, the court found that Smith had been advised of and waived his
Miranda rights, did not indicate he had questions, did not indicate he did not
understand what was happening, and did not at any time choose to stop the
interview or remain silent. (Id.) The district court held that Smith’s nervousness
and the inherent stress of a police interview were not coercive. (R., p. 357.)
Moreover, the detective’s “asking difficult questions,” challenging Smith’s
answers, and digging for more information were not coercive because “done in
the proper way.” (Id.) Because the district court employed the correct legal
standards (R., pp. 355-56) and its factual findings are supported by substantial
evidence (State’s Exhibits 1-3; 3/30/16 Tr., p. 12, L. 2 – p. 25, L. 20), the record
supports the district court’s order denying the motion to suppress.
Smith argues that “[t]he State cannot meet its burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Smith’s confession was voluntary.”
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(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)

He then discusses the evidence, especially State’s

Exhibit 2, the recording of Lieutenant Kelley’s interview of Smith. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 6-10.) Smith’s argument that the state must prove to this Court the
voluntariness of the statements is contrary to law. As set forth above, this Court
only reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Payne, 146 Idaho
at 558, 199 P.3d at 133; Atkinson, 128 Idaho at 561, 916 P.2d at 1286. Smith’s
argument inviting the Court to determine if the state proved voluntariness fails to
claim, much less demonstrate, clear error. This Court must accept the district
court’s unchallenged findings of fact and reject Smith’s invitation to review the
evidence de novo.
Smith does challenge the district court’s application of the law in two
particulars, claiming that (1) the district court “discounted the test’s lack of
reliability” and (2) failed to find State v. Valero, 153 Idaho 910, 285 P.3d 1014
(Ct. App. 2012), controlling. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-11.) These arguments lack
merit.
In this case the district court, responding to Smith’s argument “that the
CVSA discussion should as a whole be stricken,” determined that the
admissibility of the CVSA test was “irrelevant” because Smith gave his
incriminating answers “outside of the test.” (R., p. 357.) The district court’s
determination that it would not strike evidence of the interview because evidence
of the test results was inadmissible was entirely reasonable.
Nor is the district court’s analysis in any way inconsistent with the law. In
Valero the Court of Appeals noted that courts “uniformly accepted the tactic” of
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falsely telling a suspect in an interview that incriminating evidence has been
discovered, but “acceptance wanes when police misrepresent the law.”
153 Idaho at 913, 285 P.3d at 1017. Thus, when the officer in that case told
Valero that evidence he had failed a polygraph test was admissible to prove his
guilt in court, such tactic was deemed coercive. Id. at 913-14, 285 P.3d at 101718.2 Even accepting Smith’s claim that Lieutenant Kelley falsely played up the
reliability of the CVSA test to detect false statements, Smith does not claim that
Lieutenant Kelley claimed it was admissible in court or otherwise misrepresented
the law. (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) Smith has failed to show the district court
misapplied the law regarding the inadmissibility of the CVSA test results.
The district court found that Lieutenant Kelley had employed no improperly
coercive tactics in his interview of Smith. (R., pp. 355-57.) Smith does not
challenge the district court’s factual findings on appeal. Smith challenges the
district court’s legal analysis in regard to representations of the accuracy of the
CVSA test, but fails to show under applicable law that Lieutenant Kelley’s
statements that the test is accurate coercively misstated the law. Because Smith
has failed to show factual or legal error in the district court’s determination that
Lieutenant Kelley did not employ constitutionally coercive tactics, he has failed to
show error in the denial of his motion to suppress.

The other tactic deemed coercive in Valero was the officer’s statements that if
Valero did not admit to the crime he would be guilty of the “more serious” crime
of lying to the police for denying the crime in the polygraph. 153 Idaho at 914-16,
285 P.3d at 1018-20. No such coercive tactic has been claimed in this case by
Smith.
2

9

II.
Smith Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination He
Breached The Plea Agreement
A.

Introduction
Smith pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. (R., pp. 365-66, 373, 375;

6/13/16 Tr., p. 2, L. 17 – p. 3, L. 19.)

One of the conditions of the plea

agreement was that Smith would “complete a Psycho-sexual evaluation with a
full disclosure polygraph.” (R., p. 373. See also 6/13/16 Tr., p. 1, Ls. 13-14
(“The defendant will complete a psychosexual evaluation and a polygraph.”).) In
addition, the state’s recommendation of a rider was contingent upon the PSE
concluding there were “no other hands on victims.” (R., p. 373.) Smith lied in the
polygraph about whether there were other victims and, when confronted,
“terminated the process.” (R., pp. 386-87.) The district court determined the
state agreed to “recommend nothing more than a rider if the polygraph did not
indicate any other victims. Smith showed deception when asked about other
victims and when confronted about it, terminated the exam. This does not comply
with what the State agreed to. Smith has breached the plea agreement ….” (R.,
pp. 387-88.)
Smith contends on appeal that he “fulfilled his obligation under the
agreement,” asserting that providing deceptive answers about whether there
were other victims and refusing to discuss those deceptive answers “does not
mean he breached the agreement.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 15.) Smith’s argument
that the agreement required the state to make its agreed-upon recommendation,
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after he registered deceptive in relation to whether there were other victims and
refused to clarify, is without merit.
B.

Standard Of Review
“Plea agreements are contractual in nature and generally are examined by

courts in accordance with contract law standards.” State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho
491, 496, 283 P.3d 808, 813 (Ct. App. 2012). Whether a plea agreement is
ambiguous “is a question of law” over which the Court exercises “free review.”
State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 257, 281 P.3d 90, 94 (2012). However,
“interpretation of an ambiguous term is a question of fact. Factual determinations
made by a trial court will not be set aside on review unless they are clearly
erroneous.”

Nienburg, 153 Idaho at 496, 283 P.3d at 813 (citation omitted).

“[W]here the language of [a] plea agreement is ambiguous, those ambiguities
shall be resolved in favor of the defendant.” Gomez, 153 Idaho at 257, 281 P.3d
at 94.
C.

The District Court Properly Concluded Smith Breached The Plea
Agreement
“Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments

that were presented below.” Obenchain v. McAlvain Const., Inc., 143 Idaho 56,
57, 137 P.3d 443, 444 (2006) (internal quotations and ellipse omitted). Below,
the prosecution raised the issue of Smith failing to complete the polygraph
examination. (8/15/16 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 8-23.) Smith then argued as follows:
the report still comes back with a moderate risk classification, which
I think falls within the scope of the plea agreement; however, there
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was the other part, the polygraph. And so is the State now bound or
can they argue for anything they choose to?
I think under the terms of the evaluation, where the polygraph is
noted in Dr. Lisota’s report, I’d take the position that the State’s still
bound to the three and seven and a retained jurisdiction; but that’s
also consistent with the PSI, which recommends retained
jurisdiction.
But I know that does create an ambiguity, and I’m sure that falls
outside the scope of the agreement. So is the agreement breached
or is it not enforceable? I don’t know if it’s breached, but it may not
be enforceable. So one option is to have him do another polygraph.
(8/15/16 Tr., p. 36, L. 12 – p. 37, L. 3.) The district court concluded that Smith
had acknowledged that “only the second part of his deal with the State,” the part
about the finding of a low or moderate risk to reoffend, “has been complied with,”
but Smith did argue “that the agreement has not necessarily been breached, just
that it may not be enforceable.” (R., p. 387.) Because Smith did not contend
below that he was in full compliance with the requirements of the plea
agreement, he has failed to preserve that argument for consideration on appeal.
To the extent Smith argues the state was still bound to make the
recommendation in the agreement despite his lack of performance, review shows
no error by the district court. The agreement by its plain language required Smith
to “complete a Psycho-sexual evaluation with a full disclosure polygraph.” (R.,
p. 373.) Smith’s refusal to address the indication of deception on the question of
whether there were other child sex abuse victims, and termination of the process,
was not a “full disclosure polygraph.” Smith has failed to show error by the
district court.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Smith’s judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 26th day of June, 2017.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen__________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of June, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KKJ/dd

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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